Using a teleological perspective and an analytical categorization of the history of water institutions in Morocco, this paper aims to review and evaluate the institutional reforms in the country in the light of the results and hypotheses presented in some recent literature on the subject. The review suggests that considering their overall thrust and direction, the institutional reforms undertaken in Morocco are truly remarkable. While these reforms have paved a solid institutional foundation for promoting an economically responsive water sector, there are still serious reform gaps, especially in areas such as groundwater regulation and supportive institutions for irrigated agriculture. The evaluation of the reform process suggests that Morocco has exploited well the political contexts of resource limit and economic crisis, path dependent opportunities provided by existing institutions and earlier reforms, and the synergetic influences of the countrywide economic reforms and changing political conditions. Clearly, the reform experience of Morocco indicates that although undertaking initial reform can be difficult, subsequent reforms are relatively easier when the political opportunities for reforms provided by both endogenous and exogenous factors are well exploited.
Introduction
Water has remained a constraining factor for economic development throughout the history of Morocco. Over the years, the country has established a diversified body of both formal and informal regulations to govern water resources allocation, utilization and management. These water-related institutions have undergone constant modifications to reflect the changing socioeconomic, political and resource realities of the country. This paper aims to review and evaluate these changes by adopting a teleological perspective and an analytical framework that groups the history of water institutional changes in Morocco into four categories: pre-colonial era (before 1912) , colonial period , post-independence period (1956-1980s) and recent years (since 1990) . While describing the evolution of water institutional arrangements through these periods, the paper will also highlight the inherent influences and linkages within the change process over time. The paper will also attempt to explain the nature and pattern of institutional changes within the water sector in terms of historical, political, economic and resource-related factors. Finally, the reform experiences of Morocco will be interpreted in the light of some of the recent literature on water institutional reforms (e.g. Saleth & Dinar, 2000 , 2004 .
The second section of this paper describes the physical setting of the water sector with a focus on water resource potential, water allocation and sectoral orientation. The third section provides a detailed review of water institutional evolution in Morocco focusing on historical and recent changes, respectively. The fourth section deals with some key factors explaining the recent reform initiatives and also evaluates the effectiveness of the reform in addressing water sector problems. The fifth section provides evidences for the way institutional features such as path dependency and institutional linkages are used during the reform process. This section also indicates, particularly, how the reform process as observed in Morocco can be interpreted in terms of the institutional transaction cost theory proposed by Saleth & Dinar (2004) . The final section concludes by summarizing key results and indicating major implications and lessons.
Water sector in Morocco: key features
As a background for our review of the water institutional arrangements and water sector reforms in Morocco, it is useful to provide a brief description of the key features of the Moroccan water sector, especially focusing on water resources potential, utilization and sectoral and regional allocation.
Water potential and availability
Morocco, located in the northwest tip of Africa, is subject to the influence of highly diverse climatic conditions. Rainfall is distributed unevenly across the landscape and it varies from more than 1,800 millimetres per year (mm/yr) in the northern part of the country to less than 200 mm/yr in the southern part. Besides its uneven spatial distribution, the rainfall in Morocco also evinces an uneven and erratic temporal pattern owing to its large year-to-year variations. Insufficient rain and droughts are fairly frequent. Seven of the last ten years had hydrological deficits of varying intensities. In 1982, Morocco received less than 60% of the long-term mean rainfall. In 1994, on the other hand, 6 of 11 hydrological basins in Morocco had more than 50% deficit in their water balance.
The uneven rainfall pattern naturally creates highly variable flows over time and space causing severe uncertainty in water availability to both domestic users and farmers alike. It is to minimize these risks and uncertainties associated with water availability that Morocco, like most countries, relies heavily on water storage. Of the average annual precipitation of 150 billion cubic metres (bcum) received by Morocco, only 30 bcum are captured by surface (20 bcum) and subsurface (10 bcum) sources. Unfortunately, not all water captured by these sources is readily available for use. For instance, the water resources actually available for use are estimated to be only 16 bcum from surface sources and 3-4.5 bcum from subsurface sources.
Water allocation and sectoral orientation
Reflecting the historically emerged pattern, the 1995 Water Law has assigned top priority to security of the potable water supply. By 1990, most urban households had been provided secure access to water supply whereas only 14% of rural households had secure water supplies even by 1995. As the demand for potable water is concentrated in water-scarce basins, the issue of meeting a rapidly rising demand for potable and industrial water poses a major challenge. In many locations, efforts to satisfy urban and industrial demand imply interbasin water transfers, inter-sectoral water transfers from agriculture, or reliance on non-conventional sources such as desalination.
Like most countries, irrigated agriculture is fundamental to the economic and social development in Morocco. As a result, the history of water resources development in Morocco is critically linked to irrigation and agricultural development. In order to achieve its irrigation and agricultural objectives, the government has built modern and relatively efficient infrastructure for water development, conveyance and distribution. It has also supported farmers through a comprehensive administration of irrigation perimeters and a favorable system of legal and economic incentives. Irrigation has the dominant share of 85% of the total water resources developed in the country. There is considerable scope for improvement in water use efficiency and conservation. The 2020 Rural Strategy of Morocco clearly recognizes this when it underlines the need for more efficient use of irrigation water and the conservation and protection of water resources. The investment plan for irrigation is articulated in the National Irrigation Program with its stated objective of reaching 1.2 million hectares (Mha) by 2010.
To see the demand-supply gap in the irrigation sub-sector, we can relate the current and planned development of irrigation to the land use pattern to indicate, in a way, the potential demand for irrigation. Of the total land area of 71 Mha, 21 Mha are classified as rangeland and 8.7 Mha as cultivated land. However, since the cropping pattern also includes fallow periods, the actual area cultivated in any year can only be about 7 Mha. Of this cultivated area, the area suitable for irrigation amounts to just about 1 Mha. Conventionally, this area is divided into areas under largescale irrigation (LSI) and those under small and medium scale irrigation (SMSI). The modern LSI perimeters cover 0.67 Mha and they are under the administration of the Regional Irrigation Water Authorities (Office Regional de Mise en Valeur Agricole (ORMVA)). 1 The SMSI areas, which are mainly traditional systems operated by local communities for subsistence agriculture and vegetable marketing, cover an area of 0.33 Mha. On the other hand, 0.30 Mha.are estimated to cover spate and seasonal irrigation.
Hydropower is a crucial source of energy for Morocco, especially in its role in meeting the power demand at peak hours. How important hydropower is for the Moroccan economy can be indicated by the fact that it saves, on average, almost 700,000 tons of oil per year. Installed power production 1 ORMVA are the regional representation of the Ministry of Agriculture in regions with large irrigation schemes numbering nine: Doukkala, Gharb, Haouz, Loukkos, Moulouya, Ouarzazate, Souss-Massa, Tadla and Tafilalet. in 1994 was equal to 855 million kilowatt hour (kWh) representing close to 8% of the total energy production in Morocco. Although hydropower capacity is expected to exceed 1,815 million kWh by 2010, the planned expansion is severely constrained both by the time mismatch between hydropower production and water releases for domestic and irrigation sectors as well as by the lack of dam sites suitable for hydropower production.
Water balance by basins
Water management in Morocco is complex. The country, though relatively small, has a number of agro-ecological zones, each with distinct water supply conditions, production and demand requirements. Water for municipal and industrial (M&I) purposes is more important in some regions than in others and tourism is increasingly becoming an important sector in certain areas, particularly in the south. Under the water law, river basin agencies are charged with the responsibilities of managing water resources from both surface and subsurface sources, in their respective basins. Table 1 provides information both on the source-wise pattern of water supply and sectorwise allocation of water resources across the important hydrological basins of Morocco. As can be seen from Table 1 , although surface sources are dominant in the total supply of most basins, groundwater sources are very important because of their spread and ability to support both agriculture and domestic water needs in areas lacking sufficient supply from surface sources. Unfortunately, groundwater reserves have been exploited heavily in virtually all the principal aquifers. Excessive drawdown of groundwater has resulted in saltwater intrusion, threatening the lucrative vegetable production systems in some coastal regions.
While current water supply and demand are in balance in two of the eight basins, for the remaining basins, there is either a water deficit or surplus. As the total of the surpluses in three basins exceeds the total deficits of the other basins, there is vast scope for interbasin transfers as a mechanism for achieving regional water balance in Morocco. There are both past efforts and future plans for undertaking such water transfers from the surplus basins to the deficit basins. For instance, about 300,000 m 3 have already been transferred from the basin of Oum Er-Rabia to the dry areas of the Tensift, essentially to support the expansion of irrigated area in the latter basin. Similarly, another 160,000 m 3 we also transferred from the two basins of Sebou and Oum Er-Rabia to the highly populated basin of Bou Regreg. This transfer is obviously to support domestic water needs. Besides these transfers, additional water transfers to the tune of 1,540,000 m 3 are also projected from the surplus basin of Sebou. The details of these projected transfers are shown in the basin map of Morocco ( Fig. 1 ).
Evolution of water institutions in Morocco
To understand better the present structure and functioning of water institutions in Morocco, it is necessary to go as far back as the pre-French protectorate and even further back to the introduction of Islam to Morocco in the 9th century. This is because the laws and rules governing the functioning of land and water uses in the country have actually emerged from the historical superimposition of three bodies of laws and rules (Bouderbala & Filali-Meknassi, 1991) : the Orf, or customary sets of rules and admitted practices, the Chraa, or the religious interpretation of the Islamic law and rules and the modern legislation that was introduced by the French protectorate and later reinforced by Morocco since its independence in 1956. What is notable is the fact that these superimpositions were done without anyone completely suppressing the influence of the others. From this perspective, it is useful to view the evolution of Moroccan water institutions in three distinct phases: before 1912 (pre-French years), 1912-1956 (French protectorate years) and 1956-1980s (post-independence years). 
Before the French protectorate
The water legislation and water rights prior to the French protectorate were made essential by very heterogeneous customary practices (Doukkali & Benabderrazik, 2002) . These practices were strongly maintained in arid zones, where the necessity for local adjustment to hydrological and ecological conditions explains their historical tendency to resist and survive the political changes. Before 1912, the resistance was to the tendency of Islamic law (Chraa) to homogenize laws and rules applicable to the same factors and goods. But, after 1912, the resistance was to include water in the public domain and to subject them to the conditions of acquired rights.
When Islam was introduced in Morocco, the religious jurist (Ulema) 2 accepted the traditional and customary rules even though they departed from the dominant Malekite school of interpretation of the Koran that does not recognize private ownership of water. 3 This compromise was necessary to enable the native population to accept a central government authority. This interpretation allows for private property of water flows (as separate from that applied to land), rules about the priorities for water diversion 4 and rules and obligations for conducting collective work in the irrigation networks. Thus, the Chraa had no impact on the heterogeneity and diversity of local rules and customs. Its only impact was to give some moral references that remained very theoretical and without any impact on real life and real management of water resources.
Until now, in many areas, the rights derived from customary practices were more valid than those applied by the modern legislation as well as its corollary laws that state the public domain nature of water in publicly managed large-scale irrigation perimeters. However, it is notable that groundwater, lakes and rivers were not covered by these customary rules. As a result, anyone who has access to land could dig a well and no rules were defined about the location or the distance between wells, or even the rate of groundwater extraction. In this interpretation, water resources in lakes and rivers were defined as public goods under the control of the state represented by the Sultan, who was the ruler of Morocco at that time.
During the French protectorate
With the beginning of the French protectorate on July 1, 1914, the government issued a decree that placed all the surface waters in the country under public domain. 5 The two principal arguments for this decree were that: (a) all waters were traditionally owned by Morocco's central authority, the Sultans, who merely ceded usufruct rights and thus all water rightly belonged to the state; and (b) the concept of public domain was more in accordance with the true precepts of Islam than the complex tangle of existing customs related to water use (Swearingen, 1987) . Thus, by placing all waters in the public domain, this decree imposed a state control on water that was not possible even in France itself, where the only water that was in the public domain was the coastal water and water used for navigation. The real intent of this legislation was actually to protect the country's water resources until they could be developed by the protectorate administration. Five years later, on November 8, 1919, the colonial authorities issued another decree extending the public domain to subsurface waters and marshlands as well. The intent of this decree was to control the extensive marshlands in the Gharb region so that they could be drained for French settlements.
On August 1, 1925, the legislation on water was further codified by the adoption of a law that refines the public ownership of water and defines the conditions of water use for irrigation and other purposes. Obviously, this legislation strangled private water development as it was supplemented further by another decree stating the conditions for recognizing water rights. It required mandatory authorization for any water use exceeding 40 m 3 /day and allowed the administration to revoke such authorization at any time without indemnity. As a result, private initiatives played little part in the development of water resources in the country. Beside the corpus of legislation on public ownership, the protectorate also issued a law regarding water user associations (Associations syndicates agricoles privile´gie´s (ASAP)) 6 to initiate and formalize the development of private irrigation networks. The ASAP were allowed to intervene in the public domain to undertake irrigation infrastructure and were given privileges to implement this work on the infrastructure. 7 The introduction of modern legislation by the French protectorate has led to three major water rights systems: the modern registered rights under the public domain, the ancient customary rights that are recognized and registered and the ancient customary rights that are recognized but not registered. The first category is very important and dominant as it includes all bulk water in rivers and lakes. The second category includes the water owned by the ASAPs and the rights to this water are set by a decree that defines the sharing of the river water between the perimeters and the rule of the allocation based on the flow of the river. It also includes water rights owned by some farms in accordance with the 1925 law that allowed river water shares to be diverted for irrigation. These rights are to be registered as full property rights with the condition that they cannot be transmitted separately from land. The second category also includes the water rights owned by some urban water and electricity agencies (Re´gies Autonomes de Distribution d'eau et d'e´lectricite´). By law, these agencies were allowed to own wells or springs.
The third category includes the ancient customary water rights that are owned by the members of some tribes. In the case of ancient customary water rights that are recognized by the law, there are two subcategories: the water rights that are registered and those that are not registered. The first subcategory was recognized by the colonial authority to settle disputes between the local tribes and the French settlers. These rights, which are valid to date, are shares of river flows owned by some tribes like those found in the Haouz region. The second subcategory is made of ancient customary rights that are acknowledged by the central administration despite their unregistered nature. Such rights are prevalent in the Souss and Tafilalet regions. In these regions, the customary rights are still binding and their owners do not pay water charges even though the government has constructed a dam and a large-scale irrigation scheme in the area.
Post-independence era
While the basic set of laws established during the French protectorate governing water rights and water management continued even after independence, there was a basic change in the attitude of the government towards the water sector. With independence, the state adopted a very ambitious development policy centered on irrigated agriculture. This policy is known as the policy of dams. The dominant concerns for resource protection inherent in the 1914 and the 1925 laws gave place to the emerging economic requirements of the independent country. Since efficient use of water for economic purposes has been the dominant concern, the state became closely involved in the allocation and management of water resources that were developed at a high cost. As a result, the extent of state intervention in the water sector has increased. Besides its traditional roles of authorizing water use and collecting charges, the state has not only been involved in large-scale water resources development works but also covered the financial cost of both off-and on-farm structures and equipment (e.g. dams, irrigation and drainage network, leveling and land consolidation) in large-scale irrigation perimeters. For the purposes of balancing growth requirements and poverty concerns, agricultural development has become an important component of the overall economic strategy since the mid-1960s and through the 1970s and the 1980s. Indeed, the relative success of the Green Revolution in the 1960s gave ideological and theoretical support for shifting Moroccan development strategy towards an agriculture-oriented growth process. In its agriculture-oriented development policy, the government stressed both improving the productivity of already irrigated agricultural areas and expanding perennial irrigation to 1 Mha. The latter part of the policy is popularly referred to as "the million hectare" policy in Morocco. While this goal of irrigation expansion was intended to be achieved mainly through large-scale irrigation development schemes, the objective of efficient, irrigated agriculture was to be achieved by both equipping agricultural land and mandating its profitable (mise en valeur agricole) use within irrigation perimeters through legal means. 8 Increasing state intervention in the water sector is based on the legal framework of the 1969 legislation, known as the Agriculture Investment Code (Code des Investissements Agricole, (CIA)). A CIA that stands by itself has become the real legal system governing irrigated agriculture. Interestingly, the CIA is usually presented as a contract between farmers and the state, defining their mutual rights and duties in the context of public projects under LSI. It specifies the rules relating to land consolidation, modifications in cropping patterns, adoption of technology and adjustments in the level of financing. Notably, the CIA also specifies water rates. 9 As per the CIA, the water rate for each separate perimeter has three components: (a) initial investment recovery in terms of 30-40% of total cost depending on farm size, (b) full recovery of operation and maintenance (O&M) costs through volumetric pricing (see Table 2 ) and (c) a minimum consumption charge to cover the fixed parts of O&M. Besides these components, there will also be an energy cost component whenever a service of water lifting, pumping or pressuring is involved.
Factors behind recent institutional changes
From a historical perspective, the period of the 1980s was a watershed, as it led to a number of changes in the water institutions of Morocco. While religious, historical and political factors The ORMVA's of Tafilalet and Ouarzazate, situated in the desert, are exempt from water charges, given the particular situation of these two regions. Besides, as noted already, the owners of traditional customary rights in tribal regions are also exempt from the payment of water charges. guided water institutional evolution before independence, it is the demographic and socioeconomic requirements that played that role after independence. But, since the 1980s, it is the emerging macro economic necessities and resource-related realities that have prompted water institutional reforms in Morocco. In this respect, three factors deserve a close examination. These are the successive droughts of severe proportions experienced by Morocco during 1980-1985, the macro economic crisis of 1983 and the attainment of the physical limits for freshwater expansion through large-scale water resources development schemes in the early 1990s. As we will see below, these three factors have led to far-reaching changes in the legal, policy and organizational dimensions of water institutions.
Role of droughts
While droughts are not new to Morocco, the socio-economic impact of the droughts during 1980-1985 was severe owing to their successive occurrences. The government response was very prompt in terms of policy changes within the water sector, especially on two closely related aspects of water resources development. They related to the unprecedented encouragement that the government has given to individual initiatives and groundwater expansion. This encouragement took the forms of both a waiver on well authorization from the Ministry of Public Work as well as subsidies for private investment in irrigation. The policy change had a remarkable impact on private-oriented and groundwater-based irrigation expansion.
The extent of private irrigation has, in fact, surpassed all previous official estimates. For instance, the Rehabilitation Project of Large-Scale Irrigation funded by the World Bank has estimated the area under private irrigation to be about 60,000 hectares by 1991. However, according to the High Council of Water and Climate (Kingdom of Morocco, 2001) , this area was estimated to be about 170,000 hectares. But according to the information from the 1996 agricultural census and a recent survey conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture, the area under private irrigation reached 583,039 hectares in 2003. Of this total, 481,322 hectares were irrigated by groundwater either fully (as in the case of 376,662 hectares located outside the large scale irrigation perimeters) or partially for supplemental irrigation (as in the case of 104,700 hectares located within these perimeters).
The expansion of private and groundwater-based irrigation did minimize the impact of droughts as well as expand and stabilize farm production. But it is not without its negative effects. The rapid increase in private irrigation, especially in the absence of effective regulatory arrangements, has resulted not only in heavy aquifer depletion but also in serious decline in the flow of several springs and watercourses that support medium-and small-scale irrigation perimeters. Regarding the magnitude of the latter effect, it is estimated that the expansion of private and groundwater-based irrigation has reduced the irrigated area in the small-and medium-scale irrigation perimeters to the tune of 150,000-200,000 hectares. As a consequence of aquifer overdraft, well depth is increasing at an alarming rate causing the abandonment of agricultural activities. For instance, in the Guerdane perimeter of the Souss region, water table is declining at a rate of 1.7 metres (m) per year leading an average well depth of 100 m. In view of groundwater overdraft, the water deficit of this region has increased from 185 to 358 million m 3 between 1976 and 1998 (Lamrani & Marin, 2002) . The abandonment of plantations is more common, particularly in the traditional citrus exporting region of the Souss.
Role of macro economic crisis
The macro economic crisis of 1983 and its subsequent economic liberalization and structural adjustment programs have been major driving forces for some radical reforms both in water policy and water management. In the changed fiscal and policy contexts of these programs, there has been a tremendous pressure to reverse the extent of state intervention in agricultural production in general and publicly managed irrigated agriculture in particular. As a consequence of fiscal compulsion, the government was forced to undertake a number of serious policy changes. In the general sphere of agricultural management, the marketing of inputs and agricultural products was liberalized and many agricultural institutions were readjusted to cope with the development of a market-oriented agriculture sector. In the particular context of publicly managed irrigated agriculture, three major changes were made: (1) relaxation of crop pattern regulations to induce efficient and profitable water use; (2) organization of farmers for water allocation and managing; and (3) reorientation of water pricing from its cost recovery and financial roles to its incentive and allocation roles.
The liberalization of crop patterns in large-scale irrigation perimeters, though desirable for efficient water and land use, was severely constrained by the rigidities of existing water distribution networks and allocation procedures. As the production in these perimeters was oriented towards import-substituting crops and heavily dependent on state intervention for cropping decisions as well as input and output marketing, it was ill-prepared to benefit immediately from the relaxations. The issue became complicated by the lack of input supplies, marketing channels and extension services needed for alternative crop options. Moreover, the irrigation infrastructure and the water billing system were more suitable to a homogeneous crop pattern and rotation than to a liberalized system with a diversified cropping pattern. Thus, the fundamental issue that is yet to be resolved is how to move from a supply-centered arrangement to a demand-oriented system of water resource allocation and use.
The proposed solution to make the publicly managed large-scale irrigation system more flexible and responsive to local needs involves the promotion and involvement of farmer organizations in water allocation and management. While such farmer-based participatory arrangements already exist in small-and medium-scale irrigation perimeters, they are yet to be created in the large irrigations schemes. In the changed scenario after the macro economic crisis, the involvement of farmers in water allocation and management, fee collection and system maintenance has also become important for strategic and fiscal reasons. As a result, the government revised the legislation on water user associations (WUAs) in 1990 to promote WUAs in all large-scale irrigation perimeters. The stated objective was to create a total of 3,432 WUAs -532 in LSI perimeters and 2,900 in SMSI perimeters -and to revise water rates in LSI to cover the full O&M costs, and use WUAs as mechanisms to improve collection. However, even a decade after the law on WUAs was implemented, only 1,045 WUAs -445 in LSI perimeters and 600 in SMSI perimeters -could be created (Kingdom of Morocco, 2001) . The WUAs in SMSI were able to adjust positively to the revised legislation as this revision has enabled them to have access to the previously unavailable subsidies, training and rehabilitation contracts (Zahry & Rachid, 2001 ). Since they have full control over the resource and its allocation, they have indeed benefited from the empowerment brought by the revised legislation. In contrast, the WUAs in LSI, despite being represented in the boards of ORMVAs and often consulted on aspects such as annual water allocation and rehabilitation programs, remain less active than was expected in terms of maintenance works and collection of charges. Lacking self-funding mechanisms and access to credit, they are fully dependent on the state for their funding and functioning. 10 Since they do not fully control access to and allocation of water, they have an inherent limitation in their fee collection functions. In view of such a lack of real power and control, they are reduced to being auxiliary to administration and placed in a conflicting position with members resisting payment.
Although the revision of water pricing policy has been a recurrent intention of all water policy reformulations since 1978, the practical translation of such intention in the context of large-scale irrigation perimeters has remained one of the most difficult issues to resolve. 11 The two real factors putting pressure for pricing reforms are the growing budget deficit of the ORMVAs and the inevitable need to improve water use efficiency. The first factor is very critical from the fiscal perspective. To address this issue, the provision of water service was separated from the provision of other services (e.g. extension and health and quality control) by the ORMVAs. While the costs of these other services with public goods properties will continue to be funded by the public budget, the costs of water services having largely private good properties have to be fully paid by users through water charges.
Full cost recovery has become a necessity in view of both the fiscal difficulties engendered by the macro economic crisis as well as by the specific requirements of the structural adjustment programs. 12 Unfortunately, this solution has faced resistance from both water users and the ORMVAs themselves. The resistance of water users is understandable as they lack involvement in many irrigation decisions and have no say about the nature and composition of costs. The resistance of the ORMVAs is also understandable as they are severely constrained by the rigidities of the system such as cost ineffective project choices, overstaffed organization and legal and political difficulties of dealing with defaulters. As a way out of this contentious problem, a research study conducted by the Ministry of Agriculture (1997) has suggested a compromise solution of a 10-37% increase of water charge to be implemented progressively over a 6-year period. 13 Underlining a similar approach, the High Council of Water and Climate (Kingdom of Morocco, 2001) has advocated a progressive recovery of recurrent costs with due consideration to the paying capacity of farmers and productivity gains of irrigated agriculture. 10 The Agriculture Investment Code of 1969 has a provision that entitles any group of irrigation water users to a rebate of 15% if they contribute to the maintenance of the irrigation network. This provision has never been authorized by the Ministry of Finance although it is the only source of funding for the WUAs in LSI perimeters. See also Herzenni (2001) . 11 Already in 1978, a delegate minister to the Prime Minister was appointed to evaluate the activities and management of public enterprises, including the management of the ORMVAs. Subsequently, a government commission was set up in 1979 to revise the 1969 Agricultural Investment Code.
Role of resource limits
By the early 1990s, it had become very clear that there was little scope for further development of water resources through large-scale schemes, as most of the available water resources have already been mobilized. Over time, it has also become apparent that proper management of surface water and groundwater cannot be accomplished separately as scarcity becomes more pronounced and prolonged. As an inevitable result, the state was compelled to shift its focus from water development and irrigated agriculture to the most difficult and challenging frontiers of water reallocation and integrated water resources management (IWRM) from the perspective of the whole economy (Ait Kadi, 1998) .
As a major response to the changing water conditions and future economic requirements, the government passed the Water Law of 1995 (Law 10/95). The overarching goal of this law is to integrate and coordinate the allocation and management of all water sources and users under a single but decentralized institutional arrangement centered on river basin agencies (RBAs). These RBAs will have authority to manage surface water storage and allocation, groundwater pumping and water pollution and quality. The RBAs work with water sector "partners" or stakeholders in the basin area such as ORMVAs, the National Authority of Potable Water (Office National de l'Eau Potable (ONEP)), the representatives from environment, health and provincial officials and, more importantly, the WUAs. In a sense, the RBAs act as wholesalers of bulk water to ONEP and ORMVAs who, in turn, retail water supplies to urban and rural water users. RBAs now have authority to control and monitor water from all sources. 14 For example, the wells owned by ONEP for potable water supplies, which were autonomous earlier, are now under the yet to be defined RBA authority (Doukkali & Benabderrazik, 2002) . This is also true for water in public irrigation perimeters, which were once under the sole responsibility of ORMVAs.
From an overall planning and managerial perspective, the main responsibility of the RBAs is to prepare, with heavy input from the national government, river basin management plans based on the principles of IWRM. The Water Master Plan (known as the Plan Directeur), as specified in Article 16 of the water law, is a constituent part of the National Water Master Plan. 15 It must be formally approved by decree. The twenty-year Master Plan summarizes available water supplies in a river basin and proposes allocations to municipal, industrial and agricultural users. 16 The plan also provides for groundwater exploitation through granting of permits to water users. As per the new water law, the Master Plan can be reviewed and amended every five years if changing conditions warrant amendments. The RBAs have considerable managerial and regulatory responsibilities besides their role in developing and supplying water. They can monitor and regulate water use and water quality as well as plan and organize flood control and water-related emergencies within their respective basins.
The 1995 water law has also led to a significant reorganization of water administration. For instance, the General Directorate of Hydraulic, which is in charge of water development and control, has been moved from the Ministry of Public Work to the Ministry of Environment. This move signifies the emerging attention on water quality, environment and integrated approach to water management. It has also created conditions for promoting the private sector in water resource development and management. For instance, the concessions for water distribution in four large cities (Casablanca, Rabat, Tangiers and Tetouan) were granted to private water companies. The privatization efforts in the urban water and sanitation sector indicate the growing commitment of the government to quality of services, managerial efficiency and financial sustainability. Although urban water services traditionally provided by ONEP were good in quantity and quality, the cities could neither cope with sanitation and wastewater problems nor benefit from modern technologies and expertise. As a result, foreign investment and international expertise were essential to improve the overall performance of the urban water sector.
Encouraged by the positive experience of private management of the urban water sector and encouraged by World Bank enthusiasm to experiment with public-private partnership (PPP) in Morocco, private sector involvement has also been extended to the irrigation sector with the initiation of the first-ever public-private-partnership project in the irrigation sector in January 2002 (Lamrani & Marin, 2002; Darghouth, 2002) . Under this PPP initiative, two projects were planned for the construction of a transmission pipeline (Guerdane project) and a distribution network (Gharb project). In July 2004, the bid for the Guerdane PPP irrigation project was won by a consortium led by Omnium Nord-Africain (ONA), a Moroccan industrial conglomerate. 17 Following the agreement, the consortium will enter into a 30-year concession for the construction, co-financing and management of an irrigation network. The project will cost an estimated US$85 million of which the Moroccan government will provide $50 million, half as a loan and half as a grant. The project will divert water from the dam complex of Chakoukane-Aoulouz to provide water for 600 citrus farmers suffering from the effects of aquifer overexploitation that is so acute in the Guerdane perimeter. 18 Since the water tariff agreed by the consortium is lower than the existing cost of groundwater supply, the farmers will also benefit from cost saving while the economy will benefit from the revenues of citrus export. The Gharb project will divert water from an existing dam to a newly irrigated area. In this project, the private sector is expected to bring in modern management techniques for irrigation as well as O&M.
Reflections in the light of the reform literature
The Moroccan experience with water sector reforms, as described in the previous sections, also offers an occasion to reflect on some recent developments in the theoretical and empirical literature on water institutional reforms. The overall pattern and thrust of water sector reforms in Morocco are very much in line with the general reform trends across countries as reported by Saleth & Dinar (2000) . The reforms in Morocco have indeed shifted attention from development to allocation, from centralized and public management to decentralized and private arrangements, from subsidized provision to an economic approach and from sectoral perspectives to integrated perspectives of resources management. Although the water sector and its institutional arrangements have essentially evolved through historical and political conditions in the past, they are now responding more to economic and resource requirements.
From an institutional perspective, the reforms have also linked and consolidated various segments of the institutional structure within the water sector. For instance, Saleth & Dinar (2004) have proposed a three-dimensional perspective for water institutions, i.e. legal aspects, policy aspects and administrative aspects, and how they have to be sequenced and aligned for a successful water sector reform. The Moroccan experience shows that the priority assigned to these three components has been modulated during the reform process to suit sub-sector requirements, historical necessities and the stage of resource development. For a country such as Morocco, the legal aspects were crucial in the early stages and explained the ease with which the policy and organizational components shaped water sector performance. But in the later stage, especially when the legal framework becomes consolidated, policy components (e.g. water pricing, crop pattern liberalization, privatization and IWRM) and organizational components (administrative reorganization, WUAs and RBAs) are becoming more and more important in translating the legal framework for use under field conditions. Clearly, the reform experience of Morocco shows the latest tendency to reinforce the linkages between the three components of water institutions, though the space for such co-evolution varies across water sub-sectors and sources. From an overall perspective, the reforms are more advanced in sub-sectors where water management was undertaken by the state (e.g. large-scale irrigation systems and urban water supply) than in sectors with largely private management (e.g. small and medium irrigation systems and groundwater irrigation).
Another important aspect pertains to the role of path dependency properties and reform sequencing in overcoming technical and political constraints for reforms (Saleth & Dinar, 2004) . The water sector reforms in Morocco also provide a few interesting instances of the way the path dependency properties are exploited during the reform process either by design or by default. In an important sense, path dependency and institutional sequencing have remained robust factors in explaining the effectiveness of successive institutional reform initiatives in Morocco. For instance, the reforms in the irrigation sector followed only after the consolidation of reforms in the urban sector. Even within the irrigation sector, the reforms also focused more on the publicly managed larger-scale irrigation systems than on the privately managed irrigation sector. This kind of sequencing has advanced the reform process by exploiting the politically and technically favorable reform contexts and components. With the consolidation of these initial reform attempts, the prospects for further reforms or their sectoral extensions can be increased. For instance, the initial success of cost recovery and private sector policies in the urban sector and its subsequent extension to the irrigation sector, observed in Morocco, exemplify this possibility.
From another perspective, the relative success of user participation and cost recovery in small and medium irrigation systems can be explained by the prior existence of WUAs and the control the user has on water allocation. It is precisely the absence of these preconditions that explains why farmer involvement in the large-scale irrigation system has remained mostly lukewarm. We can also find several additional instances for path dependency and institutional sequencing. One instance that has applicability to most countries relates to the limited management options once an irrigation system is in public management as it is difficult to move straight to private management, though other decentralized management options involving RBAs and WUAs are possible. On the other hand, in urban areas and newly developed irrigation systems, it is possible to promote private sector management from the start. The Morocco experience also provides evidence for the importance of reform packaging. For instance, the policy of crop pattern liberalization was ineffective, essentially because concurrent changes in water distribution rules, billing procedures and marketing and extension systems have not been carried out. In contrast, the policy of promoting groundwater irrigation has been quite successful as it was coupled with the waiver of well digging authorization and the provision of investment subsidies. Unfortunately, the success of the same policy has become unsustainable because it was not pursued with proper regulatory arrangements to control excessive exploitation of groundwater.
The reform process in Morocco also reveals some interesting instances for institutional linkages and conflicts between different institutional components. The case of institutional linkages is obvious as there are considerable complementarities among segments of formal institutions as most of the macro level legal and organizational arrangements at present have been built from colonial and pre-colonial structures. However, the conflicts among institutional segments are both subtle and transparent. For instance, the conflicts and tensions between the formal rules introduced by the state and the informal and customary rules that influence tribal communities and rural areas have continued since colonial times. But in many cases, formal institutions and even religious interpretations have tried to accommodate customary rules and practices as much as possible. Instances of this include the recognition of customary rights and free access to water even within the perimeters of publicly managed large-scale irrigation systems as well as the inability of the state to regulate groundwater withdrawals in privately managed irrigation systems. The private exploitation of underground water for irrigation is another example of the lack of capacity of the state to implement new regulations or to modify the prevailing regulations.
More importantly, the nature, extent and thrust of water sector reforms in Morocco are also amenable to interpretation in terms of the institutional transaction cost framework proposed specifically to explain water institutional reforms (see Saleth & Dinar, 2004) . According to this framework, institutional reforms are prompted and conditioned by the transaction cost and political economy effects of both endogenous factors (e.g. water scarcity and financial crisis) as well as exogenous factors (e.g. macro economic crisis, change in political balance and international and donor pressures). As we have seen, this framework can explain the why and how of reform initiatives both before and after independence. Specifically, the recent reforms clearly reflect the role of both the impact of the macro economic crisis as well as the effects of emerging resource realities. Similarly, the proliferation of state interventions in agriculture in general and the irrigation sector in particular, ever since the policy of dams, has culminated in tremendous fiscal and organizational costs for the state. The macro economic crisis has magnified these costs leading to significant liberalization and decentralization initiatives. What is more important to note is the way aspects such as path dependency and institutional sequencing are used to minimize transaction costs and political opposition. However, there are also glaring instances in the way politico-economic factors have distorted the transaction cost calculus. For instance, although groundwater regulations are critical to ensure the sustainability of groundwater-based irrigation systems, the government has preferred to follow the policy of water transfers to take place, with heavy investment and subsidies (e.g. the Guerdane project). This case, as well as the inability to complete water pricing reforms, clearly suggests how political costs have overshadowed the real socio-economic and resource costs within the transaction cost framework.
Conclusions and implications
From a historical perspective, the institutional reforms undertaken in Morocco, especially since the new law of 1995, are truly remarkable. Considering the overall thrust and direction of the reforms already undertaken, it is clear that Morocco has now a solid institutional foundation for promoting an economically responsive, user-oriented and allocation-based water sector. But, there are still serious reform gaps, especially in areas such as groundwater regulation, systems adjustment within large irrigation schemes and supportive institutions for irrigated agriculture. However, with the consolidation of past reforms, implementation of additional reforms and a more effective application of the new water law can guide further institutional refinements and changes essential for translating an integrated approach to water management within a participatory setting and decentralized framework.
Despite their limitations and partial coverage, the reforms undertaken so far in Morocco offer some interesting insights and lessons that are of value to the institutional economics theory and water sector reform policy. The reform process, as observed in Morocco, reveals the need for attempts at consistent but somewhat sequential reform in all three components of water institutions, i.e. law, policy and organization, related to different sectors. Depending on the economic, political and resource realities, various components can be sequenced to minimize the cost of institutional transactions and political opposition. The reform experience in Morocco also provides evidence for the role in transaction cost implications of factors both internal and external to the water sector. Morocco has exploited well the political contexts of resource limit and economic crisis, path dependent opportunities provided by existing institutions and earlier reforms, and the synergetic influences of the countrywide economic reforms and changing political conditions. Thus, the reform experience of Morocco suggests that although undertaking initial reform can be difficult, subsequent reforms are relatively easier as the country consolidates and adjusts with the earlier reforms. Likewise, while there are powerful technical and political constraints for reforms, there are also equally powerful political opportunities for reforms provided by both endogenous and exogenous factors.
